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「軍無糧食則亡」The army will perish without food. Sun Tzu1

「準備三月，打仗一天」Prepare three months, fight one day. Chinese proverb.2
「子貢問政。子曰：足食，足兵，民信之矣。」Zigong asked about government.
The Master said, You need enough food, enough weaponry, and the trust of the common
people.3 Confucius.
Introduction
In 1949, the United States Government published the China White Paper as justification
for withholding military aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government (KMT) during the Chinese
Civil War, which many blamed as the cause of the KMT’s loss to the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).4 In the China White Paper, the claim was made that “in no small measure, the
predicament in which the National Government finds itself today is due to its failure to provide
China with enough to eat.”5 Six years prior to the American government making this conclusion
in 1943, the KMT sent one of its leading public health official’s, Tsai Chiao, to visit America and
describe some of China’s nutritional challenges to American scholarly audiences at the request
of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation of the University of Chicago.6 Chiao was
Western educated at the University of California, Indiana University and the University of
Chicago and was a physiologist at the National Central University in Nanjing.7 He told his
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American audience that as a result of several Chinese nutritional studies, “for the most part,
Chinese diets are adequate in calories, but deficient in animal protein, vitamins, and certain
salts.”8 He stated that several years prior, the Nutritional Committee of the Chinese Medical
Association had recommended an increase in animal protein for Chinese diets, “but it has not
been possible to follow this recommendation.”9 Chiao then told the Americans that Chinese
soldiers “received animal food usually once, or at most twice, a month.”10 The idea that meat
was an imperative ingredient to a daily diet played directly to American audience’s own
understanding of food. Perhaps coincidently, over the next two years, the American military
spent considerable resources attempting to rectify this lack of meat in Chinese soldiers’ daily
diet. In researching this attempt, it appears that while certain aspects of China’s military food
system changed, these were far from universal, were reliant on a local populace, and were
unsustainable beyond America’s direct intervention.
By the end of World War II, the Americans had felt that their nutritional experiment
with the Chinese soldiers had had some limited success. American Colonel Charles F. Kearney,
who was a liaison officer to the Chinese Army logistics unit, believed that “the Chinese were
shown that armies on the march could be given an adequate, balanced diet,” which was based
on “what the Americans thought to be effective procedures.”11 Kearney, however, concluded in
his report that he did not believe permanent or lasting changes had occurred in the Chinese

8

Tsai Chiao. “Problems of Nutrition in Present Day China.” Voices from Unoccupied China. Ed. By Harley
Farnsworth MacNair. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1944. Page 16.
9
Ibid. Page 17. I was not able to find the report Chiao cited other than what was presented at the conference.
10
Ibid.
11
Quoted in Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland. China, Burma, India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI. Center
of Military History. United States Army: Washington, D.C. 1999. Page 243.

3

military before the end of World War II.12 Indeed, the research into American and Chinese
archives suggests that there was a gap between what American military leaders tried to change
and what actually occurred on the ground.
The tension between what American leaders attempted and the actual reality in China
also reflects the debate surrounding America’s aid to the KMT government and its leader
Chiang Kai-shek. Many American observers who lived in China during the 1930s and 40s and
were associated with the U.S. State Department, War Department and newspapers believed
that the KMT government was hopelessly corrupt, incompetent, and not worthy of America’s
aid.13 While recognizing faults in the KMT government, Generals Joseph Stilwell and Albert
Wedemeyer, America’s senior representatives to China during World War II, believed that
fundamental changes to China’s armies could happen and that this would allow China to
successfully compete with Japan’s military.14
More recent scholarship of the KMT has changed many of these negative views. Instead
of incompetency, the recent scholarship has shown the KMT was limited more by
circumstances.15 As Hans Van de Ven concluded about the KMT from studying its method of
warfare, “rather than seeing these…as evidence of irredeemable backwardness and
incompetence, I suggest that the approach was in reality firmly grounded in local realities and
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indigenous practices.”16 Another scholar, who studied Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries, made the
comment that “[Chiang Kai-shek] was caught between a rock and a hard place. On one side
were his nominal domestic partners who might turn against him if he pushed the reforms too
far and harmed their interests. On the other side was the important American ally who seemed
totally unempathetic to his domestic difficulties but kept pressing him to implement the reform
aggressively.”17
One such reform was the nutrition of China’s soldiers. Perhaps unrecognized by
American observers of the time, by 1945 China had adopted and nurtured a system of feeding
its soldiers that was centered around its agrarian economy and mainly supplied rice and wheat.
The soldiers then had to purchase additional food on the local economy from their individual
military salary.18 This system had been used during the years of war against the Japanese and
continued to function despite corruption, flooding, famine, and hyper-inflation.19 American
observers, however, felt China’s nutrition was inadequate and needed an overhaul to reflect
American ideas about food. By taking as a case study the methods used to feed China’s soldiers
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before, during, and after World War II, this paper also highlights some critical limitations of
America’s foreign policy to enforce internal changes in a developing country.
In 1945, a military food system was developed between the Americans and the Chinese.
This system utilized China’s own internal resources to procure and distribute rice, meat, and
vegetables directly to its soldiers. The official history of the United States Army details
extensively these changes and suggests that they would have become universal and perhaps
permanent if not for the sudden end of World War II.20 Unfortunately, this official history does
not bring in Chinese sources nor does it show China’s efforts to feed its soldiers throughout the
war. It also does not detail China’s attempts to universalize this military logistical food
distribution system past the end of World War II because once the war concluded, America’s
mission changed and was no longer interested in jointly developing military logistical systems
with China.
Other than the official history published by the United States Army, there are few
Western scholars who study China’s military logistical systems during 1945. In China and
Taiwan, when scholarly works refer to military food adjustments made during 1945, they
primarily cite this official history from the United States Army.21 The U.S. Army’s official history
of World War II in China was well written and documented, but leaves room for further
scholarship based on other sources such as the Nanjing Archives, which is the depository for
China’s official government documents from 1912-1949, the Academia Historica Archives in
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Taiwan, which house Chiang Kai-shek’s and other senior KMT officials documents and
mandates, as well as memoirs and journals. These additional sources suggest that American
pressured permanent changes to its military food system was never realistic because the
infrastructure required simply wasn’t there.
This paper focuses on the events of 1945 when the United States military was more
than willing to provide technological and industrial resources to help the KMT change its
logistical food supply system. Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT military were willing
to tell America they were altering China’s supply system to meet the requirements of the
American allies. By bringing in Chinese primary sources and comparing them with American
sources, it can now be seen more clearly what changes were made, why they were made, and
when they worked and failed.
In this paper, I will first discuss the context for American nutritional pressure. I then
discuss the context of China’s military food logistics followed by an in-depth analysis of the
1945 changes and the succeeding efforts in the Chinese Civil War to feed the KMT soldiers
without American aid. Ultimately, the sources suggest American changes affected only a small
subsection of the Chinese Army for a short period of time, but for the bulk of the soldiers, the
food system remained effectively the same. It was unrealistic for America to assume that an
agrarian society devastated by years of warfare could swiftly adopt an American based food
system without significant American investment of resources. In fact, the system pushed by
Americans proved to be unsustainable beyond American direct involvement.

American Military Food Development

7

To more fully understand America’s pressure on China to adopt a different military food
system, one must understand the development of America’s food industry and its logistics of
getting its food to the front lines in warfare. Shortly after the end of World War II and the
Korean War, U.S. Army historians examined the development of the standard ration for a
soldier, which was defined as one meal for one soldier. These historians found that since the
beginning of America, the U.S. ration was adapted and changed as the nature of fighting
evolved.22
World War I brought drastic changes to the ration and the means of delivering it to the
soldier. This war, unlike other wars in which America was involved, was much bigger. The war
placed an emphasis on “mass movement and mass supply to far-off centers.”23 The solution to
this problem required greater industrialization and the “combined efforts of science, the food
industry, and the food supply services of the military establishment.”24 World War I required
preserving large quantities of food for lengthy periods of time while being transported over
large distances to the soldiers at the front line. Industrial plants in Chicago packaged the rations
in iron and tin cannisters that were large, expensive, and prone to spoilage and contamination,
especially in the trenches. The deficiencies in feeding the American soldier during World War I
spurred even more industrial ingenuity to overcome the problem of spoilage in transporting
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food over long distances.25 The resulting ration would be used by Americans in all theaters of
World War II.
It was also during this time that the idea of the calorie as a calculable criterion came into
being. By the 1930s, American scientists professed that the number and type of calories
required by humans each day “differed according to age, sex and levels of exertion, but the
scientists were uncertain as to exactly how many calories were needed for different
activities.”26 A decade later in May 1941, the American Food and Nutrition Board published a
table of daily nutrients that were needed for a person to maintain good health.27 This table
allowed the military to judge the diets of its soldiers and determine if they were receiving
enough food to perform adequately. It is now commonly understood that an average military
soldier needs approximately 4,000 calories a day to perform all the physical requirements of
the job.28 However, in the 1940s, the idea of the calorie was not well defined, though it was
understood and believed that a proper diet consisted of meat, vegetables, milk, and fruit since
they were “all essential foods which protected the body from disease.”29 Experiments and
conclusions made about calories led to changes in the American diet and the development of a
large industrial base that could produce food in mass quantities and then distribute it over long
distances.

25

Ibid. Page 13-14.
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. Penguin Press: New York. 2012. Page
268.
27
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. Penguin Press: New York. 2012. Page
420.
28
Goldberg, G.R. “Intake and Energy Requirements”. 2003. Encyclopedia of Food Sciences and Nutrition. Academic
Press. Page 2096.
29
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. Penguin Press: New York. 2012. Page
269.
26

9

China’s Military Food Logistics
When conflict finally broke out with Japan, China was not militarily prepared to defend
itself and the KMT government had to flee westward from Nanjing, deep into the heart of China
to Sichuan province, which was many hundreds of miles away from the conflict and the
provinces in which the KMT held most control. In 1937, Japan swiftly gained control over many
provinces and sponsored their own Chinese government in Nanjing that directly competed
against the KMT for legitimacy. Due to the dynamics of this power struggle, Ch’i Hsi-sheng, a
prominent Taiwanese historian, noted that “it was difficult to identify a single province where
the Central Government could honestly claim to enjoy a degree of control comparable to what
it had enjoyed [in the Eastern provinces] before 1937.”30
After the KMT government fled to Sichuan Province, Chiang Kai-shek laid out his military
plan to fight the Japanese. He instituted a “scorched-earth policy to fall back into the interior”
of China to conduct a war of attrition because China’s armed forces and weapons were “weak
as compared with Japan.”31 To best accomplish this vision of fighting the Japanese, Chiang Kaishek arranged the military forces of both the Central Government and the provinces in a war
zone perimeter around Sichuan that would hopefully protect his government from defeat by
Japanese troops.32 Broadly speaking, these war zones would act as a buffer-zone and help the
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Chinese government to endure longer while it sought advanced weapon systems from more
advanced industrial countries that could compete with the firepower of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek
had for years wanted better military equipment, but China did not have the industrial capacity
to produce heavy military equipment and weapons and had to rely on outside aid. 33
It was clear many years before fighting began in 1937 that China’s war with Japan would
be difficult. A large reason for this difficulty was that Japan was heavily industrialized with
advanced weaponry and China was not. In anticipation of the war with Japan, Chiang Kai-shek
attempted to increase his country’s industrial output. According to the History of the SinoJapanese War, published by the Chinese government in Taiwan, China’s industry was able to
produce all forms of small arms, but not much else.34 The KMT consequently sought foreign
assistance and initially looked to Germany for aid in the 1930s. Germany supplied the KMT
military with advanced weaponry and modern training techniques, most of which went to the
KMT’s most loyal troops rather than other regional and provincial forces.35 However, with the
outbreak of war with Japan, the German advisors were recalled. China then signed a treaty with
the Soviet Union immediately after hostilities began with Japan that provided China with
“millions of dollars’ worth of warplanes, bombers, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, ammunition,
and trucks.”36 This treaty served an important stop gap between German and US aid. By the
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time of Pearl Harbor, China was holding out in expectation and anticipation of America
supplying its troops with advanced weaponry and modern training.37
While waiting for outside assistance, China still had to meet the logistical requirements
of its troops. During the Anti-Japanese war, China’s military food procurement and distribution
systems remained largely unchanged from those used in the prior Warlord and Qing era. It was
expected that local county governments would provide all the necessary food provisions as
armies passed through those regions.38 In 1939, Yu Feipeng, the director of the logistics
department of the KMT armies, wrote to Chiang Kai-shek about the upcoming military
campaign. In this letter, Yu said that “for the grain supply, in addition to carrying two days’
worth of rations, the unit will still distribute rice to the troops after purchasing it in local
areas.”39 In other words, the expectation was for soldiers to rely on local agrarian communities
for their sustenance and not on a centralized industrial structure, like the United States.
The KMT, however, still allocated significant resources into the military food industry. In
fact, of the seven industries associated with National Defense, the food industry was fourth in
estimated value of its production, behind the mining, cloth, and chemical industries.40 The food
industry associated with China’s national defense was listed in 1941 as solely flour and oil
products because the KMT government only issued rice or wheat to a soldier with the rest of a
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soldier’s diet provided from supplementary income or foraging.41 Significantly, there was no
meat industry or plants listed anywhere in that 1941 document detailing every industry and
product associated with China’s National Defense.42 Similar absences were noted in other
documents researched in the Nanjing Archives.
To ease the logistical challenge of providing enough grain to the soldier during the war,
China designated 2.5 cups of raw rice or wheat for each soldier per day.43 The determining
factor for whether a soldier received rice or wheat was the location of the soldier. The KMT
stationed troops near areas with surpluses of food and grain.44 Northern provinces primarily
provided wheat and southern provinces provided rice. “Sichuan supplied both” wheat and rice
to its military forces.45
The government also mandated that for the transportation of military grain, soldiers
would not move the food if the distance was more than 20 miles.46 Instead, civilians would
move the grain the needed distance. In 1939, the government allocated money to construct
granaries within each war zone that could house half-a-years’ worth of grain for military
personnel. Within a year, construction of most granaries was complete.47 At the end of the war,
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the logistical department for the KMT military was accountable for 290 granaries spread
throughout the country.48 These granaries were located near agricultural centers and key
transportation nodes such as roads, railways, and waterways.49 Placing granaries in these
locations made it easier for the local troops to procure and distribute the needed grain to the
soldiers. Other than grain, the KMT military expected the Chinese soldier to forage for wild
onions, garlic, mushrooms, and leeks to eat with their rice or purchase extra food from thier
monthly allowance.50
The problem with supplementing a soldier’s diet with a set amount of money to
purchase additional food was the rising inflation rate that decreased the purchasing power of
the Chinese soldier. According to reports, by 1941, the purchasing power of a soldier had
decreased 80 percent. By 1942, the price of grain had increased by over 3,000 percent.51 In fact,
by June 1944, “the monthly cost of living for ordinary soldiers in Chengdu, one of Sichuan’s
major cities, was over eleven times their pay.”52
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Besides decreasing purchasing power, inflation also enticed corruption among military
leaders trying to provide for their families. General Chen Cheng, who was appointed
commander of the Wuhan garrison in 1940, witnessed the abuse of military commanders
controlling the supply and grain for their troops during the times of massive inflation. He
mentioned several military commanders who stole rations from soldiers, stockpiled the extra
food, and then sold them to civilians rather than provide them to the troops.53 The military
leaders had every incentive to do this as they were struggling to provide for their own families
from their salaries. Besides outright stealing of military rations from the soldiers, it was also
commonplace for military commanders to misrepresent the number of soldiers on their books
because the annual rice allotment was based on the number of soldiers within a unit. If the
reported numbers were higher than the actual number of soldiers, then that meant more food
per actual soldier and more opportunity for the commander to sell from the food stockpiles to
the civilian populace. Therefore, in the 1944 military food quota, the KMT government
requested repeatedly for confirmation of the number of soldiers in an area. 54
China also looked to other avenues to curtail inflation’s effects on soldiers. Significantly,
in 1941, the government convened a financial conference in Chongqing where it was decided to
alter the tax collection method so that an individual would pay taxes in produce, such as rice
and other crops, rather than strictly cash.55 Collecting taxes in kind rather than money had
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multiple ramifications for the KMT government. The most positive result of this policy was that
it allowed the government to avoid and somewhat curtail problems associated with inflation
“because the army no longer had to purchase so much food on the open market.”56 However,
there were also negative consequences to this policy, such as the “burden of feeding the armies
fell directly on the peasants.”57 This would not be an issue in a time of plenty, but in a period of
famine, the consequences could be deadly because a farmer’s food went first to the
government. For example, in times of famine, local politics sometimes exacerbated the severity
of the crisis. In the summer of 1942, Hubei and Shaanxi provincial authorities refused to
transport excess grain to Henan to alleviate the pressures of both famine and the military grain
tax because they did not want to sell grain to a sister province for “increasingly worthless
government currency.”58
In 1944, the KMT government determined that the Ministry of Food and Ministry of
Finance would oversee procuring rice for the soldiers. The specific combat unit would be
responsible for collecting the food from granaries directly. However, if the unit had
transportation difficulties, the unit could issue cash to the soldiers or to the local government,
who would then be responsible for supplying food to the soldiers. The unit had to be within a
day’s worth of travel round trip to be eligible to travel to a granary.59
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Distributing grain to soldiers, however, was a challenge because the KMT government
had a shortage of 100-liter rice bags, which were used for rice storage and transportation. This
also limited the amount of rice available for sale in the general economy. It was anticipated that
the military would need approximately 10 million bags of rice and flour each year.60 According
to a report to the Central Government from the Daxin Flour Company in Shaanxi Province, the
company needed 30,000 strips of silk cloth each month to make enough flour bags for the
amount of flour produced, with no less than 18 days a month dedicated to producing flour for
the military.61 At the time, the KMT determined that “the bags of grain for the army and
military are crucial and so are the factories.”62 During the war, only 70 factories in unoccupied
China produced flour with the largest factory able to produce 5,000 bags of flour per day. Prior
to the war, there were well over 100 flour factories with the largest able to produce more than
14,000 bags per day.63 While the number of flour factories remained somewhat large in number
their capability to produce flour decreased significantly because of the war. Unfortunately, the
grain and flour factories needed specific machines to “manufacture new grain bags,” which
were in short supply throughout the country and made it difficult for the factory to operate at
the level required.64 The grain bags were made out of silk cloth and factories needed
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substantial quantities of coal, oil, and silk, all of which were also in short supply, to manufacture
them.65 Consequently, in 1944, the KMT government mandated that provinces “should as far as
possible use old bags to deliver the rations to the soldier and the machines.”66
Reusing old bags was just one of many methods used to ensure soldiers received the
allotted amount of grain. In fact, when there were fluctuations of troop levels in areas due to
the shifts on the battlefield, the logistics units had to be even more creative. In one instance,
the influx of soldiers into Guizhou from the 24th Army Group, who were originally stationed in
Hubei and Hunan, required the Ministry of Military and Public Affairs to purchase additional
grain from Guizhou’s local markets. Yet, Guizhou’s supply of grain was already exhausted, so
the Ministry had to allocate vehicles out of its own fleet to send grain from Guizhou’s
immediate provincial neighbor, Sichuan.67 For the Chinese Expeditionary Forces fighting in
Burma, the original plan was to transport grain to them from Xikang Province, but due to the
difficulty of transportation because of unimproved roads and shortages of fuel, the KMT
government decided it was more cost effective to pay Burma to distribute Burma’s own grain to
the Chinese forces.68
When the 1944 military food quota was published, the Department of Food became
aware that Guangxi’s provincial government had difficulty raising military food from local
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farmers, in part because the provincial government had to flee to the countryside. The
Department of Food consequently borrowed grain from counties in the East and North of
Guangxi in anticipation of the requirements for the following year’s rations. They also planned
to pay for the transportation of military food along the Guangxi-Guizhou border and prepared
50 trucks to transport grain from other areas of Guizhou to the frontline troops in the area. 69
Poor harvest yields were also a challenge. In June 1945, China’s Minister of Food, Xu
Kan, wrote to the Civil Service Office to inspect the claims about the bad harvests in Guizhou
and the desire of Liping County to be exempt from gathering military grain because of the bad
harvest. The claim was that the poor yield was making everyone’s life in Liping County seem
“like living in a prison.”70 In Qinghai Province, the 1945 harvest was not enough for the number
of soldiers stationed there. They were short by 2,000,000 liters of grain. Xu Kan requested that
Gansu Province be prepared to make up the difference.71 Western Hunan also faced grain
constraints during these latter years of war. In early 1945, it was reported that Western Hunan
had an increase of troops stationed there, but the granaries in Hunan did not have enough
grain left over. Unfortunately, transportation challenges made it impossible to move grain from
other provinces to Hunan because the waterways were in a drought, and the aftereffects of war
had destroyed crops that would have been part of the military grain tax. The KMT government’s
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solution to the problem was to purchase an additional 90,000 bags of grain, or enough grain to
feed an additional 41,000 soldiers for a year, at a cost of upwards of 276,000,000 yuan, a value
that was decreasing in purchasing power daily.72

China Adopts a New Military Food System
In 1944, Japan’s final offensive in China, the Ichigo campaign, almost destroyed the KMT
forces, and resulted in a massive shift in geographic control of China in Japan’s favor. This
campaign lasted until December 1944. In the end, Japan ended the Ichigo campaign, mainly
because of difficulties in supplying its troops so far forward from its main supply hubs.73
However, the crisis was so great that in December of 1944 that the U.S. military encouraged
President Chiang Kai-shek to retreat from Chongqing further into the Chinese hinterland, but
Chiang refused. He wanted to remain in Chongqing.74 Consequently, the American and Chinese
military commands placed even greater emphasis on training and arming Chinese troops with
more modern American weapons.
At the same time, American military leaders pressured the KMT to not just provide grain
to its soldiers, but all other necessary food as well, specifically meat. To Americans, modifying
China’s military food system meant that China was adopting a more scientific understanding of
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and appreciation for the calorie.75 This also marked the beginning of America’s use of food and
the calorie to push its foreign policy beliefs and exert pressure on foreign governments.76
Before detailing how the military food system changed for the Chinese in 1945, one
must understand how America was involved in China during the war. From the beginning of
World War II, America’s interest in China was to keep it fighting Japanese forces so that Japan
could not pull its best troops away into the Pacific Theater or join forces with Germany in the
European theater. America wanted to mainly focus on fighting Germany and only shift its
military focus to Japan once Germany was defeated.77 Consequently, until the war in Europe
subsided, American aid to China was purposefully minimal.78 At the outset, the War
Department in Washington D.C. felt that the largest obstacle to fighting Japan from China was
getting supplies into China because of its “almost complete isolation.”79 War Department
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planners consequently felt the best way to help China was to open up a land supply passage
into the country from the Indian Ocean and Burma, present day Myanmar.
General Stilwell, who was America’s military representative to China, Burma, and India
for most of World War II, helped develop and followed this strategy. He advocated that “Burma
must be our first objective.”80 As American military leaders in China had no combat troops to
lead, General Stilwell’s purpose was to advise and aid the Chinese military as best he could
while fulfilling the War Department mission to open a supply route to China. Such a passage
could furnish China with food and supplies that would allow China’s military to march to the
Pacific Ocean and drive Japanese forces out of the country. In support of this mission, China
sent several armies to Burma, called the Chinese Expeditionary Force, which would be the main
offensive weapon against Japan.
Stilwell believed Chinese forces, properly supplied with “good food, warm clothing,
rapid hospitalization, and modern arms”81 was equal to any other modern military force. He set
about to ensure that Chinese soldiers in Burma were “properly trained, equipped, supplied, led,
and fed.”82 However, Stilwell believed that China’s system of ration provisioning was
insufficient and caused more harm than good. In November 1943, he sent an official memo to
Chiang Kai-shek telling him that the supply arm of the Chinese military needed to provide “meat
and oil, by local purchase, and by shipment. There are plenty of sheep, goats, and cattle, in
Yunnan. There is plenty of salt. The oil will probably have to be shipped in.”83 The reason for
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this demand of Stilwell’s was his perception “the majority of the [Chinese soldiers] are
physically incapable of sustaining prolonged hardship. Malnutrition is common, due to poor
diet. Meat and fats are entirely lacking, and salt and fresh vegetables are insufficient.” 84 The
Chinese military and government ignored Stilwell’s demand because he ignored local Chinese
realities and naively assumed Chinese military logistical systems could and would change if
mandated. When the Chinese did not comply, Stilwell ensured the British in India provided all
the food Americans felt were needed for the Chinese Expeditionary Forces. The ration there
included 6 ounces of flour, 3 ounces of peanuts, 3 ounces of beans, 20 ounces of rice, 8 ounces
of vegetables, 8 ounces of fresh meat, ⅔ ounces of salt, ¼ ounce of sugar, ⅓ ounce of tea, 2
vitamin pills, and 1 egg per day.85
This conflict over rations highlights just one aspect of Stilwell’s thorny relationship with
the KMT government that only festered and eventually boiled over for many other reasons that
are detailed elsewhere.86 In fact, within a short period of time, Chiang Kai-shek asked President
Roosevelt to recall Stilwell to the United States and be replaced by someone else. Taiwanese
scholar Hsi-sheng Ch’i explained, “in the eyes of many Chinese, the Americans around Stilwell
were the most arrogant and least understanding foreigners they had ever dealt with.” 87 General
He Yingqin, who had served as China’s Minister of War and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek,
said of Stilwell in his memoirs that “his personality is stubborn, rigid, and self-serving, and his
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prejudices are too deep.”88 President Roosevelt finally acquiesced to Chiang Kai-shek’s recall
request in the fall of 1944. On October 31, Stilwell was replaced by General Wedemeyer.89
Like Stilwell, General Wedemeyer also wanted to drive the Japanese to the Pacific
Ocean. However, Wedemeyer’s attitude and approach was much different. Part of the reason
for the different approach was Wedemeyer did not have to worry about what was transpiring in
Burma or India as his mission was solely based in China. Wedemeyer was therefore able to
focus his attention solely on how best to improve Chinese forces with Chinese resources.90
Wedemeyer also was more respectful of the KMT leadership and China’s role in the war with
Japan. He believed in the KMT military’s potential because unlike France who “had surrendered
in six weeks…China was still resisting after more than seven years and nearly three million total
casualties.”91
However, Wedemeyer also entered China at a time when Japan was completing its final
offensive against the Chinese military, who were retreating swiftly at the onslaught. The
situation was dire for Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT military, but Wedemeyer did not find the
KMT military capable of combating the threat.92 General Wedemeyer further blamed Stilwell
and those who worked with him, for the situation. In a letter to a friend the month after he
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arrived, he said, “When I arrived [in China], I found the American effort was absolutely
disorganized and ineffective.”93 General Wedemeyer brought in his own staff and went about
seeing what he could do to improve the situation. Soon, Wedemeyer and Chiang Kai-shek
developed a respectful relationship and many of Wedemeyer’s suggested policies and ideas
were accepted and adopted.
Wedemeyer’s first major revision was to create a Joint Staff between the American and
Chinese military leaders. This proposal was suggested by Stilwell before he was recalled, but his
relationship with Chiang Kai-shek by that point was too acrimonious for any progress to be
made.94 After the suggestion by Wedemeyer was adopted, Chiang Kai-shek appointed General
He Yingqin to command the forces who would be primarily responsible for the summer 1945
military campaign. In General He’s memoirs, he summarized General Wedemeyer’s
contribution to the Chinese Army and pointed to the joint staff operations and the work of the
Chinese logistical unit that ensured supplies and equipment made it to the Chinese soldier as
examples of Wedemeyer’s success. Once the joint meetings began, the two military staffs
“exchanged opinions and worked together to solve difficulties in a spirit of friendliness and
mutual respect.” The result of these meetings was “quite effective.”95 Prior to this, the two
militaries had no regular forum for discussion of mutual goals or a place to resolve conflicts
between them.
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Not all Chinese Army units were represented in this joint effort. In fact, of the 38 group
armies in the Chinese Army, totaling over 5 million soldiers, only seven group armies were
directly under the Central KMT Army authority, comprising approximately 500,000 soldiers.96
The others were under the direct control of provincial authorities and garrisons and not under
the same chain of command.97 The seven group armies under the Central KMT Army were then
reorganized into a counter-attack force of two armies for offense (Alpha Forces) and two
armies for defense with only the two offensive armies receiving American weapons and
equipment.98
The reorganization of China’s Army was titled the Alpha Plan and was officially
implemented on February 2, 1945.99 Prior to the development of the Alpha Plan, however,
Wedemeyer began putting pressure on the Chinese to reform the ration that was given to
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Chinese soldiers. Upon arriving in China, Wedemeyer quickly became “convinced that the
simple failure to feed the Chinese soldier underlay most of China's military problems and that
the Chinese armies needed food even more than they needed guns.”100 His office received
reports that many Chinese soldiers were too weak to march and that they were dying along the
roads because of poor nutrition.101
Less than two weeks after arriving in China, General Wedemeyer began sending official
memorandums to Chiang Kai-shek detailing problems with getting enough food to the Chinese
soldiers. The memo sent on November 12, 1944 requested that the “Central Government
provide funds to Division and Army Commanders to buy rice locally if they cannot furnish it
directly to their forces.”102 Wedemeyer then suggested that the American military liason
officers could front the money in emergency situations so that “local rice purchases could be
made immediately.”103 The KMT government would, of course, reimburse this money directly
to Wedemeyer’s office.104 Beginning on December 6, 1944 and through the end of January
1945, in less than two months, General Wedemeyer’s office sent no less than 13 official
memorandums detailing suggested improvements to the Chinese ration.105 On December 15,
1944, General Wedemeyer even went so far as to point out that the Chinese Expeditionary
Forces in Burma, who would soon be returning, would “continue to receive the same rations,
pay and supplies to which they have been accustomed.”106 Implied in this memorandum was
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that the disparity between the rations of the units in China compared with those in Burma
would negatively impact the morale of the Chinese soldiers who had never been to Burma. At
first, when the Chinese Expeditionary Forces returned to China, the Allies planned to have their
rations shipped in from India rather than rely on China’s resources. However, General
Wedemeyer put a stop to that out of concern for morale. He recommended to Chiang Kai-shek
that the six months of rations being furnished by the British for these returning troops be
instead “stored within China in appropriate time and places for emergency use.”107 The
memorandums also expressed the idea that desertions would decrease significantly if there
was a better ration for Chinese soldiers.108
In Memorandum 298 on December 19, 1944, General Wedemeyer recommended
implementing a separate council between the Food Ration Office of the Chinese Services of
Supply and American Officers to review the current Chinese ration and develop improvements
to the overall system of procurement, storage, and distribution of rations. The Americans
would merely act in an “advisory capacity, coordinating and directing the efforts.”109 On
January 11, General Wedemeyer recommended the Alpha Forces receive a food ration of
comparable quality as the Chinese troops in Burma.110 On January 24, 1945, General
Wedemeyer sent a memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek detailing the main points of a conference
held with representatives from the Ministry of Food, Department of General Affairs, and
American Officers. The conference identified that the Ministry of Food was incapable of
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providing meat to the Chinese soldier because it was outside their responsibility. The
conference also found that the China Food Corporation was developing an emergency ration
for use by the Chinese soldier but that “shortages of machinery…limit the output.” The U.S. War
Department was requested to send experts to China to assist in the production of the
emergency ration.111 The next day, General Wedemeyer’s office submitted reports to Chiang
Kai-shek from the subject matter experts in the U.S. Army on the food situation in China along
with a promise that U.S. “food trucks will be made available to the Food Ministry to facilitate
and expedite the collection, storage and distribution of food to the Chinese Soldier.”112 By
February 1, 1945, the new ration was adopted in a joint Sino-American conference that
mandated a Chinese soldier receive 27 ounces of rice, 2 ounces of beans, 1 ounce of peanuts,
11 ounces of vegetables, ⅓ ounce of salt, and 1 ounce of meat per day “when local
procurement [was] feasible.”113 Significantly, the rice was more and the meat less in quantity
than what the Chinese Expeditionary Forces received in Burma from British storehouses, which
suggests that China’s own internal capabilities to provide such a ration may have been
consulted.
In March of 1945, the General Wedemeyer’s office gave an update to Chiang Kai-shek
on the new ration for the Chinese soldiers. This memo detailed that the Chinese Ministry of
War, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Food, and a new Joint Council for Food were all directly
involved in the procurement process of this new ration. It also contained a recommendation
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that the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, War Transportation Board, and Committee of
Control of Liquid Fuels become involved.114
From February to July 1945, more than seven memorandums were submitted to Chiang
Kai-shek from General Wedemeyer suggesting improvements and pleading for actual
implementation of the ration that was agreed upon.115 As late as June 1945, General
Wedemeyer used such language as “we must as early as possible adopt [a] uniform ration for
all members of the Chinese Military Forces including officers and enlisted men” that would
include “a certain number of pounds of meat.”116 The next month, Major General McClure, who
was Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff, wrote to him that Chiang Kai-shek “has settled the ration
problem and I believe he can solve most of our other problems.”117
On July 29, 1945, China’s Central Daily News published almost a full-page length article
written by General Wedemeyer. In the article, he touted many recent improvements to China’s
military because of America’s direct intervention, to include food, pay, and clothing.118 Near
the end of the article, he made the claim that because of Chiang Kai-shek’s personal
intervention, Chinese soldiers now received a much larger salary and all the food and clothing
they needed. “Normally, a Chinese soldier earns US $1.50 per month, and they have to pay
their food expenses from this. Now they get $30 per month, and food and clothing are provided

114

Hoover Archives. Wedemeyer Papers. Box 85, Folder 2. March 6, 1945.
Hoover Archives. Wedemeyer Papers. Box 85, Folders 1-4.
116
Hoover Archives. Wedemeyer Papers. Box 85, Folder 4. 18 June 1945.
117
Hoover Archives. Wedemeyer Papers. Box 82, Folder 18. Letter to Lieutenant General A.C. Wedemeyer from
Major General R. B. McClure. 4 July 1945. Page 3.
118
In December 1944, General Wedemeyer recommended to Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese soldier’s pay should
be increased by one U.S. dollar per month to help in purchasing food on the economy. Zongtong jiang gong dashi
changbian chugao. 5th Volume, Part 2. Editor Qin XiaoYi. Taiwan. 1978. Pages 655-656.
115

30

by the government.”119 Private Lee Pin Pao, a Chinese soldier, read that article and wrote
immediately to General Wedemeyer to question the veracity of his claims.
This came as a great surprise to me because Chinese soldiers could never get such a good salary,
even a Commanding General has rarely received that amount. A second class private received
only 300 [yuan] per month, we now receive 900 [yuan] and it is really not enough to buy a box
of cigarettes of high quality, a pair of shoes or a shirt. Chinese soldiers are left unnoticed by our
Government and people. How can we be contented and cooperate with your soldiers in the
future counter offensive? It is requested that the Chinese Government be consulted with regard
to our present conditions to augment our salary more than 1,000 percent (the prices of common
necessities have been risen more than 10,000 percent). This would help our living condition.120

Wedemeyer forwarded this letter to Chiang Kai-shek as written and translated. It may be
debatable, however, how genuine this letter was as Chinese privates, many of whom were
forcibly enlisted, were often from the village poor, and most likely illiterate.121 Also, there was
plenty of anti-KMT forces that had an interest in thwarting any sign of positive KMT-American
relations that plausibly could have written this note.122 However, if Wedemeyer’s claim that a
Chinese soldier’s pay improved was false despite mandates by the KMT government and
pressure from America, then it is also questionable what improvements occurred in a Chinese
soldier’s daily diet that Wedemeyer also claimed was improved. To further throw doubt on the
suggestion that the “ration problem” had been resolved, the official numbers from the United
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States Army are instructive. During the height of the summer 1945 campaign, the Americans
reported that the joint food logistical system was able to provide food for only 185,000 soldiers,
which was still a fraction of the total number of soldiers.123 As discussed earlier, there were
approximately 500,000 soldiers under the central KMT authority, which was approximately a
tenth of the total Chinese forces. Consequently, it is debatable how much the Chinese soldier’s
daily diet changed during this time.
Wedemeyer, for himself, continued to believe that he had been successful at helping
the Chinese adopt an improved ration and distribution system for the Chinese soldier. In his
memoirs, written almost a decade after the fact, he wrote that “the ration plan … had a
salutary effect throughout [China].”124 Wedemeyer, however, had at least two incentives for
claiming success with the ration. First, it would serve to highlight his success in his role as the
senior American military leader charged with assisting China’s military situation. Secondly, it
would also serve to show that America could work with the KMT’s unique political reality
without CCP involvement, something that Stilwell and his staff often questioned.125 The conflict
over which American general was more correct about China continues to this day.126
Some Chinese military leaders, however, appeared to have believed the Chinese
soldier’s diet had improved. Just as General Wedemeyer had incentives to believe the diet had
changed as prescribed, Chinese military leaders also had incentives to portray that the diet had
improved. Critically, it would show that the Chinese were good allies and capable of receiving
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American instruction and aid. On April 25, 1945, General Chen Cheng, who was the Minister of
Military and Public Affairs, gave a speech where he claimed the military food logistics had
improved but admitted that until transportation challenges were fully resolved, any
improvements to feeding the soldiers were only temporary solutions.127 General Zhang Fakui,
who was the commander of one of the defensive armies in the Alpha Plan, noted in his
memoirs that the new ration and system of procurement, storage, and distribution
“undoubtedly reduces corruption and fraud” in part because the soldiers were supplied “more
quickly than before.”128 However, the negatives to this plan included transportation delays such
as food trucks not arriving to the unit on time, leaving the soldiers with what they had with
them. Sometimes, it took two days longer than expected for fresh vegetables to arrive, which
made the quality of the vegetables questionable.129 This also points to the complexity of
feeding the Chinese soldiers.
The end of World War II on August 15, 1945 changed America’s military relationship
with China. All American military training of Chinese forces were canceled.130 The American
supply teams went home over the next several months after first transferring all U.S. facilities
and property over to the Chinese.131 General Wedemeyer was ordered from the War
Department not to support any efforts by the Chinese KMT during an internal civil war conflict,
which was expected to occur at any time as the Communists and the KMT were each vying for
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political control of China. The Chinese Civil War commenced almost immediately and ended in
1949.
General Wedemeyer, however, was not interested in America leaving the KMT
government completely empty-handed. He was concerned about the new Chinese ration and
system of procurement and distribution. He wanted the system to remain even if the
Americans were no longer involved. In Memorandum Number 869-7 dated February 12, 1946,
Wedemeyer counseled Chiang Kai-shek to continue issuing the recently developed ration to his
troops as well as preserve the system that procured and distributed that ration. Specifically,
Wedemeyer advised that the KMT forces ensure a “capable, trained and experienced supply
organization” that would be responsible for furnishing food to the soldiers. However, he did not
give any indication for how to determine what a capable organization looked like. Wedemeyer
also suggested that a separate food purchasing commission continue to purchase the food
separate from the tactical organization.132 Implied in this system was that a separate
organization would prevent the military command from stealing food and money from its
soldiers.
In preparing for the upcoming Chinese Civil War, the KMT split the country into two
spheres of logistical support. North of the Yangtze River was split into five different war supply
zones while areas south of the Yangtze River were returned to civilian control.133 The sixth war
supply zone covered all of Northeast China and Manchuria. That area was placed under the
command of General He Shili, who was appointed in 1944 to be Deputy Chief of Staff of Joint
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Logistics to assist Weidemeyer.134 General He had the opportunity to be a graduate of the U.S.
Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth where he was a classmate of
General Wedemeyer.135 As part of General He’s duties in Manchuria, he was responsible for the
coordination and distribution of all the supplies flowing in from the South to the various
military units in Manchuria, comprising approximately a million troops. The supplies were
shipped from Shanghai to the port in Qinhuangdao, a distance of over 1,000 miles, before being
placed on trucks or trains to the cities of Shenyang or Changchun, a distance of well over 180
miles.136 The importance of Manchuria for the KMT was immense as according to unofficial
statistics, “the military expenditure on transportation to the Northeast alone account[ed] for
about 40 percent of the national military expenditure.”137 In fact, Chiang Kai-shek felt that
controlling Manchuria from a strategic and military standpoint was key to cementing the KMT’s
control over China after the devastation of war.138
It is difficult, however, to really know how well China’s new military ration and its
procurement and distribution system was implemented by the Chinese forces after the
Americans left at the end of World War II. The archives consulted contain the policies that were
passed, but there was limited discussion on what the situation was on the ground other than
one passing reference made on September 9, 1947. The government reported that the logistics
department “strives to provide physical supplies to avoid inconveniencing troops or breeding
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malpractice.”139 In the economic section of the Nanjing Archives, the military food industry was
discussed, but only in relation to the salt, sugar, and flour industries.140 In 1947, the Ministry of
Food’s progress table for the handling of military rations discussed the 1946 data and stated
the plan in 1946 was for the Chinese armies to need “6,344,390 bags of rice, 6,553,600 bags of
wheat, and 633,600 bags of sorghum.” No meat or other food was listed.141 In discussing grain,
the Ministry of Grain made the statement in 1947 that “there was no shortage of military
rations all over the country.”142 However, in the military section of the Nanjing Archives, it
appears the Chinese took Wedemeyer’s counsel in the passage establishing the KMT Army’s
Procurement Agency.143 The military food Procurement Agency would work with local
governments to purchase non-staple foods, specifically meat, at a local price, which then were
transported by individual units from the warehouse to the soldiers.144
To better know how well the ration and food procurement system was adopted by the
Chinese forces, other sources such as memoirs must be consulted. According to the memoirs of
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Wang Dingjun, who was stationed in the logistics unit of the Qinhuangdao army in Manchuria,
when the city of Changchun fell to the Communists, “there was still a large amount of food in
the national army, indicating that the national government at that time was supporting [the
war in Manchuria].”145 The KMT army went so far as to airdrop food into the cities and
“dispatched personnel to set up depots in many small strongholds to store food and
ammunition” in the areas controlled by the national army. Unfortunately, due to the pace of
the war, “these small strongholds fell one by one, [and] the whereabouts of the warehouse
staff sent by the military station were unknown.”146 Other sources claim that there was
adequate food for the KMT soldiers in Manchuria, but that the overextended supply lines and
poor transportation, not the supplies themselves, contributed to the loss of Manchuria.147
One of the first cities to fall in Manchuria was Changchun. The city was surrounded by
the Communist Army and besieged to such an extent that no food was allowed in by ground
and the people were starved into surrendering.148 When the refugees made their way to the
port defensive area of Qinhuangdao, the KMT army issued rice and vegetables to them.149 The
rice used by the military in Manchuria was transported by boat from Shanghai to Manchuria
and distributed to the units from there.150 As far as meat goes, the method of procurement
during the Chinese Civil War appears to have descended into more coercive practices.
According to Wang Dingjun, rather than having a separate agency purchase food from the local
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populace to then distribute to the soldiers, it was the units themselves who interacted directly
with the locals for food. “The cooking team would go from house to house to catch chickens,”
offending the local populace in the process of acquiring needed meat.151 This method was
different than the plan envisioned by the KMT military in the Nanjing Archives after the end of
World War II as it was not a separate procurement agency purchasing food from the populace
but the local unit itself taking needed food from the locals.152 However, the demands of the
conflict changed the reality for food procurement on the ground, especially since there had not
been enough time between the end of World War II and the onslaught of the Chinese Civil War
for the KMT to solidify a sustainable system in Manchuria. According to Wang Dingjun’s
account, the CCP army did not have such bad relations with the local populace and were able to
feed their prisoners of war two meals a day with meat included.153 Other scholars have
provided in depth analysis as to how the CCP secured such loyalty amongst the rural classes,
especially in Manchuria.154 That analysis, however, was beyond the scope of this research. In
the latter part of 1949, the KMT officially lost its war with the CCP and fled to Taiwan for safety.

Conclusion
To finish this story, it will be instructive to return to Tsai Chiao’s lecture at the University
of Chicago in 1943 where he concluded that “if nutrition in China is to be improved, there must
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simultaneously be improved the general economy, the output of agricultural products, and the
health education of the people.”155 These areas are fundamentally not the purview of any
military. In Chiao’s opinion, however, unless those three other areas were improved, China’s
“fundamental problems of nutrition will remain largely unsolved.”156 This paper has suggested
that Chiao’s conclusions in 1943 were largely correct as the American sponsored 1945 rationdistribution plan appeared to not last beyond American direct intervention.
The American military, with all its resources could not force permanent internal
nutritional changes in China.157 The Chinese agrarian economy was devastated by near
continuous warfare with Japan for eight years and could not sustain such drastic changes
without immense support in resources and technology. America’s solution to improving the
Chinese soldier’s diet in 1945 was to centralize the food procurement and distribution methods
and deliver to the soldier all the food he would need each day, especially meat. This happened
primarily, and perhaps only, for those directly involved in that year’s military campaign in
Southern China. America was willing to provide trucks and personnel to transport that food to
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those soldiers and the local populace was willing to provide the food to that agency to support
the fight with Japan.
After the end of World War II, America pulled its military back home, with some
Americans feeling that their efforts at improving the Chinese ration had not produced any
drastic permanent changes. The Chinese sources, however, are mixed in their assessment of
these changes post-American direct guidance and aid. The Military section of the Nanjing
Archives suggest meat was now included in a soldier’s ration he received daily provided by a
procurement organization separate from his military unit. The economic section of the Nanjing
Archival sources suggests the only food the soldier received was rice, wheat, and sorghum. In
consulting memoirs, at least one memoir available suggested that regardless of whether meat
was included in the diet or not, the KMT military was not physically capable of providing meat
to the soldiers during the subsequent Chinese Civil War. In those circumstances, the military
units and soldiers themselves were left alone to procure their meat and other non-rice food on
the economy, this time most likely through force.
Consequently, we are left with questions about the universality of the changes to the
Chinese ration. We may never know exactly how widespread this new ration system was
without access to other sources. However, after reviewing the available sources, I believe the
truth about the new Chinese ration most likely lies near the side of some limited attempts at
adopting the calorie as a measure of health, but failing in implementation because of the
realities of China’s internal economy devastated by war. An agrarian economy devastated by
years of warfare cannot be expected to implement in a short period of time a highly
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industrialized food system on its own, even with external pressure and significant foreign
monetary investment.
Speculating about the KMT’s eventual universal adoption of an American-centric food
supply system if not for the devastations of the Anti-Japanese War and the demands of the
Chinese Civil War parallels Lloyd Eastman’s argument from the 1970s. In discussing the KMT’s
attempts to modernize its political and economic systems prior to the Anti-Japanese War, he
said “if the regime had been given more than a decade before it was drawn into the vortex of
war, it might have resolved these problems.”158 Eastman, however, quickly followed this
statement with the qualification that this expectation was unrealistic because the KMT’s
political forces “were too weak to impose efficiency and accountability upon” the governmental
bureaucracy.159 Unlike Eastman’s conclusion, this paper suggests that the greatest factor
preventing widespread change to the military food industry was not so much political as much
as practical reasons. A Western-centric ration, if it was implemented, was only implemented for
a short period of time and affected only a small minority of Chinese soldiers. Although it
appears that some efforts were underway to universalize those changes, the succeeding civil
war laid bare the KMT’s inability to implement permanent systemic changes throughout all of
China. It also laid bare the American military’s inability to force permanent nutritional changes
in a developing country that could last beyond direct American intervention.160
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